Gary Bettman's "Deferred Money" Controversy

When the NHL Player’s Association negotiated a cap on escrow for the 2021 season, they were fully aware that they would have to pay back every penny they received above 50% of hockey revenue. At that time, the NHL was desperate to host their playoffs, giving the players more bargaining leverage than perhaps they’ve ever had. They used that leverage to get paid more of their money up front, even though they’d be paying back a big chunk of it if the league starts a new season with empty buildings.

So when Gary Bettman announced in November that the league would need more deferred money to meet their targeted Jan 1^st return date, the union was rightfully upset that Gary was back-tracking on something that was lawfully negotiated and agreed to. Some people might be confused by the “zero sum game” appearance of this whole saga. Revenue gets split 50-50, so what difference does it make if it’s paid sooner or later? The longer you let the players keep their money, the less they actually have to pay back. The players can collectively invest that cash while they have it, earning money from their money, functionally lowering the cost of escrow.

Gary stepped on a hornet’s nest when he announced that the league needed to change the terms of their negotiated agreement. The optics were terrible, and the media pounced. While I have not read the fine print of the new CBA, my suspicion is that the league mistakenly or inadvertently gave the players favorable repayment terms. Whether Gary’s negotiating team knew it at the time or figured it out later, I don’t know. This is all speculation on my part, but it’s what I’m reading between the lines of Gary’s press releases.

It’s also possible that a certain number of teams genuinely can’t afford to resume operations without fans in the buildings. Some of the struggling franchises may not be able to afford covering operating expenses without ticket sales, and that’s at the root of Gary’s recent demands. If that’s the case, then Gary should have simply said so. He should have said that the league can’t afford to resume play until fans are allowed back, and if that takes several months and potentially jeopardizes the season, then so be it. That should have been the starting point, then force the union to renegotiate if they want to save the season. But once Bettman says that, then the Jan 1^st start date becomes virtually impossible. He wanted the best of both worlds.

The Jan 1^st start date may already be logistically impossible. Perhaps the tactic here was to make it seem like the union was pushing back the anticipated start date, instead of the league simply announcing it can’t be done. Trying to extrapolate the NHL’s strategy from these press releases is a difficult task. It’s plausible that the league’s financial footing is weaker than they care to confess, or they are just mad that the NHLPA potentially won a victory in collective bargaining that allows them to functionally lower the cost of escrow. The answer might lie somewhere in between. I can only guess the NHL’s motive, but something doesn’t add up.

At this rate, we’ll be lucky if the NHL resumes play by February 1^st.

Jaromir Jagr Trade Tree

Sometimes bad trades can lead to bad trades. If we follow the ownership line from transaction to transaction, what “trade tree” would lead to the greatest number of bad deals? Going through every trade ever made in the NHL and connecting them together would require some painstaking research. I can't guarantee that this is the worst trade tree of all-time, but it's a contender and it all started with the Jaromir Jagr trade from Pittsburgh to Washington in 2001. That kicked off a series of unfortunate events that is still active today. Let’s follow the tree.

1) 2001, the Penguins traded Jaromir Jagr to Washington for a bag of pucks that included Kris Beech. None of the assets that the Penguins received in return for Jagr turned into quality NHL players. Jagr had led the NHL in scoring the year prior. I’m not sure there has ever been an Art Ross winner traded for less in the summer he won the award. 

2) 2005, the Penguins eventually traded Beech to Nashville for a draft pick.

3) 2006, Nashville trades Beech and a 1^st round pick (that became Semyon Varlamov) to Washington for Brendan Witt. Awful trade. Witt scored 3 PTS in 23 GP for the Predators who were eliminated in the first round of the playoffs in 5 games. He then left via free agency that summer. Varlamov is closing in on 400 NHL games. This made my list of worst deadline trades in the salary cap era.

4) 2011, Washington trades Varlamov to Colorado for a 1^st round pick (that became Filip Forsberg), and a 2^nd. Varlamov has been mostly mediocre since arriving in Colorado (aside from one great season), with the team only making the playoffs once in his 7 seasons. Forsberg on the other hand has become a star, scoring 229 PTS in 304 GP (and counting) in a Preds jersey. At this point in the tree, Washington has come out ahead, making three great trades, but it’s about to get worse.

5) 2012, Washington trades Cody Eakin and the 2^nd round pick they got in the Varlamov trade for Mike Ribeiro. Washington was eliminated in the first round and Ribeiro bolted via free agency. Eakin has played over 400 NHL games since that trade.

6) 2013, Washington trades Forsberg to rent Martin Erat, which is among the worst deadline deals in NHL history. The Caps were eliminated in the first round of the playoffs (where they got zero PTS from Erat). This trade also made my list of worst deadline deals in the salary cap era. 

I’m not sure if there has been a worse NHL trade tree in the 21st century. There are at least 5 bad apples on this tree. If we diverge from the direct ownership line to see what branches from other trees are attached to this one, it starts to get a bit wild. That 2nd round pick that the Colorado Avalanche traded for Varlamov has an interesting back-story. It had originally belonged to the Boston Bruins. The Bruins traded it to Toronto with a 1st round pick (that became Rickard Rakell) and Joe Colborne for Tomas Kaberle. It’s debateable if this was a bad trade, as Boston won the Stanley Cup, but he was only their 5th defenseman who contributed very little in the finals.

But wait, there’s more. Toronto turned around and traded that 2nd round pick to Colorado for JohnMike Liles. Liles was a bust in Toronto and was sent to the Marlies before being swapped for another bad contract in Tim Gleason (whom they later bought out). Certainly the two trades that attach the Kaberle tree to the Jagr tree are bad trades. This didn’t work out so great for the Leafs, who also traded the 1st round pick they got for Kaberle to move up in the order and draft Tyler Biggs. The Leafs got Biggs, the Ducks got Rakell and John Gibson in a classic example where trading 2 lower picks for a higher pick turned out to be an epic fail.

You might remember the name Tyler Biggs, but not for a glorious NHL career. He was traded with Phil Kessel to Pittsburgh. So now the whole Kessel trade tree is connected to the Jagr tree (although not by a route of direct chronological ownership). Guess who else is in that Kessel tree? Yes, one Tyler Seguin. Who was famously traded from Boston to Dallas in an awful trade that Bruins fans still complain about to this day.

I challenge anyone to find a worse trade tree than this. I would expect any such tree to grow the most in the salary cap era. The cap forces teams to make a greater number of bad trades. The Kessel tree did not grow from the Jagr tree, their branches connect higher up the log. But even just looking at what unraveled from that one bad seed is fascinating. Lupashuk, Sivek, and Beech for the Art Ross winner is a nominee for the most terrible trades in NHL history. What came afterwards is a remarkable coincidence. 

2018 Canadian Men's Olympic Hockey Team and NHL Waiver Wire

With the NHL skipping the Olympics, Hockey Canada has built an Olympic hockey team of NHL castaways. A friend sent me a text message today asking "how many times has the new Olympic hockey team been waived in the NHL?" It can be hard to find reliably complete transaction data on the internet, when it comes to something like waivers (especially when dealing with lesser known players). The "Pro Sports Transactions" website looks to be the most complete that I can find, so I spent 6 hours one day copying and pasting hundreds of pages of transactions into a spreadsheet.

So how many times has the new Canadian Olympic Hockey Team been waived in the NHL? This may not be every single time they've cleared waivers, but that have been placed on waivers at least 39 times, maybe more. I can only find 4 instances where a current team Canada player was claimed off waivers by another NHL team.

Andrew Ebbett, waived 7, claimed 2

Mason Raymond, waived 4, claimed 0

Rene Bourque, waived 3, claimed 0

Gilbert Brule, waived 3, claimed 1

Eric O’Dell, waived 2, claimed 0

Rob Klinkhammer, waived 2, claimed 0

Cody Goloubef, waived 2, claimed 0
Justin Peters, waived 2, claimed 0

Linden Vey, waived 2, claimed 0

Kevin Poulin, waived 2, claimed 1

Ben Scrivens, waived 2, claimed 0

Chay Genoway, waived 1, claimed 0

Stefan Elliott, waived 1, claimed 0

Quinton Howden, waived 1, claimed 0

Marc-Andre Gragnani, waived 1, claimed 0

Brandon Kozun, waived 1, claimed 0

Karl Stollery, waived 1, claimed 0

Derek Roy, waived 1, claimed 0

Christian Thomas, waived 1, claimed 0

Wojtek Wolski, waived 0, claimed 0

Mat Robinson, waived 0, claimed 0

Maxim Lapierre, waived 0, claimed 0

Chris Kelly, waived 0, claimed 0

Chris Lee, waived 0, claimed 0

Maxim Noreau, waived 0, claimed 0

Should The Red Wings Renew Ken Holland?

Ken Holland is probably heading for the Hall of Fame. As General Manager he’s won 3 Stanley Cups (plus 1 Cup as an assistant GM) and helped put together a streak of 25 consecutive playoff appearances. He became the Red Wings GM in 1997 and inherited a team that had just won the Stanley Cup, a team he had helped build as an assistant. He may have inherited Lidstrom and Yzerman, but he drafted Datsyuk and Zetterberg. Whatever impact he had on the first 2 Cups of the Lidstrom dynasty, he sure had his fingerprints all over the next 2.

The Red Wings long playoff streak finally came to an end in 2017, and now the team finds itself in a dark hole. Holland's contract will expire at the end of this season and it's still uncertain if he will sign a new deal. Feelings in Detroit are mixed. Fans owe him a debt of gratitude for the team's accomplishments under his tenure, but the current roster is a dumpster fire. Datsyuk is gone, and Zetterberg won't be far behind.

At this point I should mention that I've been a Red Wings fan since the 80s. By 2012 Ken Holland had reached legendary status as a General Manager, and I rarely questioned his decisions. I was pretty sure the man could walk on water if he tried. The moment when I first raised my eyebrow was when he traded a 1st round pick for Kyle Quincey, which came weeks before Nick Lidstrom's retirement. Losing a Hall of Famer near the top of his game is always a devastating blow, and it's hard to replace them in free agency. I'm sure Holland pitched all the big names who became available. 

Where he needed to replace Lidstrom, Rafalski, and Stuart was through the draft...and that's been a problem. In the 4 drafts prior to Lidstrom's retirement, the Wings drafted 10 defensemen, Max Nicastro, Adam Almquist, Nick Jensen, Gleason Fournier, Ben Marshall, Richard Nedomlel, Mattias Backman, Alexey Marchenko, Ryan Sproul, and Xavier Ouellet. None of those guys are a legit top four defenseman, and 2 of them currently make up the Wings bottom pairing. In the 4 drafts after Lidstrom's retirement, the Wings only drafted 6 defensemen, and it looks like they'll all be strikeouts. 

Over 8 drafts surrounding Lidstrom's retirement, they drafted 16 defensemen and have 2 bottom pair D to show for it. That makes some sense. Between 2007 (Brendan Smith) to 2016 (Dennis Cholowski), they did not draft any defensemen in the 1st round. 14 of 16 were drafted after the 2nd round. It's remarkably difficult to land top-4 D after the 2nd round. If you're going to rely almost exclusively on rounds 3+ to pick defensemen for 8 consecutive drafts, you're at serious risk of ending up in their current predicament.

Holland has not done well drafting defensemen. He has tended to use his top picks on forwards, hitting a home run on Dylan Larkin, and to a lesser extent, Anthony Mantha. Evgeny Svechnikov is struggling to score in the AHL this season with 5 PTS in 25 GP. Michael Rasmussen did not even get invited to Canada's World Junior camp. Holland's batting average in the draft has been getting worse.

Now I'd like to grade all his significant trade and free agency decisions. Because when you look at the sum of what he's done post-Lidstrom, it's valid to question if he's an effective re-builder. He made a Hall of Fame career putting the right pieces around Nick Lidstrom, and ever since he lost his horse in 2012, it's been a downward spiral. He did a good job of adding picks at last year's trade deadline when it became apparent the playoff streak was ending. 

He gets an F on drafting defensemen; a grade that re-appears a few times analyzing his individual transactions since Lidstrom's retirement.

Trades

*Feb 2012 Traded a 1st round pick for Kyle Quincey. That pick could have been Olli Maata, Mike Matheson, or Brady Skjei. If you want to argue Quincey was necessary to extend the playoff streak, then maybe it's a C-, certainly in terms of rebuilding, it was an F. Grade: D-

*Mar 2014 traded Calle Jarnkrok and a 2nd round pick for David Legwand. Legwand did little to help the team. Maybe he helped them make the playoffs and this a D+, but he had no PTS in the playoffs and those were two good assets. Grade: F

*Mar 2015 traded a 3rd round pick for Marek Zidlicky. Zidlicky was out of the league a year later. Grade: D-

*Mar 2015 traded a 2nd round pick and Mattias Janmark for Erik Cole and a 3rd round pick. Cole's NHL career was over 11 games later. Grade: F

*Jun 2016 traded Jakob Chychrun and Pavel Datsyuk's dead contract to Phoenix for Dennis Cholowski. We'll have to wait to see how good Cholowski becomes. Chychrun went directly to the NHL. Grade: D+

*Feb 2017 traded Brendan Smith for 2^nd and 3^rd round picks. Grade: A

*Feb 2017 traded Tomas Jurco for a 3^rd round pick. Grade: B+

*Mar 2017 traded Thomas Vanek for a 3^rd round pick. Grade: B+

Free Agents

*Jul 2012 signed Jordin Tootoo to a 3 year $5.7M contract that was eventually bought out. Grade: F-

*Nov 2013 re-signed Jonathon Ericsson to a 6 year $25.5M contract that expires when he's 36. This may have helped extend the playoff streak, but the contract reached awful status by 2016. Grade: D-

*Apr 2013 re-signed Jimmy Howard to a 6 year $31.8M contract. Grade: F+

*Jun 2013 re-signed Jakub Kindl to a 4 year $9.6M contract. Grade: F-

*Jul 2013 signed Stephen Weiss to a 5 year $24.5M contract that was bought out after 2 years. Grade: F-

*Jul 2015 re-signed Gustav Nyquist to a 4 year $19M contract. Grade: B-

*Jul 2015 signed Mike Green to a 3 year $18M contract. I might have to come back and change this grade after the trade deadline, but currently...Grade: D-

*Nov 2015 re-signed Justin Abdelkader to a 7 year $29.8M contract. He turned 30 years old in year one. This contract will get worse, the offensive production has already slowed. Grade F

*Jul 2016 re-signed Danny DeKeyser to a 6 year $30M contract. Grade: D

*Jul 2016 re-signed Darren Helm to a 5 year $19.2M contract. Grade: F

*Jul 2016 signed Frans Nielsen to a 6 year $31.5M contract that expires when he's 38. Grade: F

*Jul 2016 re-signed Tomas Tatar to a 4 year $21.2M contract. Grade: D

*Jul 2017 signed Trevor Dailey to a 3 year $9.5M contract. Grade: D-

There is an argument to be made that all his bad transactions were more about making it to the playoffs every year instead of re-building, and now the sum of these short-term decisions has created a long-term problem. If ownership was telling him to win at all costs you could argue he's blameless for the current predicament. The fact that Detroit is no longer an appealing destination for free agents has probably compounded the problem and forced him to overpay. That being said, I'm sure Mr Ilitch never told him to do a terrible job drafting defensemen, and draft picks don't get to choose what city they play in.

Thank you for your service Ken Holland. It's been a great ride and you've got your seat reserved in the Hall of Fame. It's time for new blood. Unfortunately, the perfect guy for the job is already employed down in Tampa. There's no guarantee the next GM will do a better job. Being a General Manager in the NHL is incredibly difficult. Looking at the last 5 years and where we currently find ourselves, it’s time to move on. 

Are The Carolina Hurricanes Moving To Texas?

For the past few seasons the Carolina Hurricanes have been at or near the bottom of NHL attendance. Owner Peter Karmanos has been himself waist deep in financial trouble, having been sued by his kids for borrowing money against their trust. Rumours of the Hurricanes being sold have been running rampant over the past year, until a majority share was finally sold to Texas billionaire Tom Dundon in December of 2017 (pending approval). Everyone involved has been quick to say he is not moving the team to Texas, despite the perilous attendance situation that’s been plaguing the franchise.

The Hurricanes parent company Gale Force Holdings leases the arena from the “Centennial Authority”, and has an agreement to run arena operations for another 7 years. That would need to be broken for the team to move and is cited as the reason this team is staying in Raleigh. Some guy on Twitter tried telling me that the team is profitable because NCAA basketball also rents the building and draws good crowds. According to Forbes magazine, GFH lost $1.3M from PNC arena operations in 2015 (the most recent earnings report I could find online), which also includes the income from NCAA basketball games at the facility. Just having a successful 2^nd tenant is not enough to make arena operations profitable.  Sorry dude.

Earlier this year, a Texas lawyer tried to purchase the Hurricanes but his bid fell apart in October when he failed to secure enough investors. Shortly after that bid failed, the billionaire owner of the Houston Rockets Tilman Fertitta expressed an interest in bringing in an NHL team to his facility. Then shortly after that announcement, another Texas billionaire Tom Dundon bought controlling interest of the Hurricanes. All signs point to Texas. Houston is the 7^th largest media market in the United States, Raleigh is the 25^th. Gary Bettman loves large media markets.

Even if Dundon intends to move the team back to his home state, nobody can openly say that. For at least this season they have to make due with their current home, and if the fans expect the team is moving, nobody is going to show up for the remainder of the schedule. I’m not a lawyer and don’t know how or if they can break their arena lease to move the team. It seems like where there’s a will, there should be a way.

It does feel a bit strange that a few weeks after one Texas billionaire expressed his interest in NHL hockey, a different Texas billionaire bought the Hurricanes. Maybe it’s just a coincidence that all the suitors are coming from the same state. It begs the question, are they working with or against each other? Is there a competition to see who can be the first to bring NHL hockey to Houston, or is there perhaps collaboration? If Fertitta had bought the Hurricanes 3 weeks after saying he wants an NHL franchise, it would have been obvious what he intended to do.

As bad as things might be in Carolina right now, the situation in Phoenix is even worse. Revenue sharing and expansion money were able to offset the money loss in Canes hockey ops. It's possible that the team will start winning games, fans will start buying tickets and everyone will be happy. Or the status quo will persist and the downward spiral will continue. If I were a gambling man, I'd bet money they're moving to Texas before the arena lease expires.

NHL Waiver Wire All-stars (2005-2016)

If you made an All-star team of players claimed off waivers in the salary cap era, what would it look like? Players are being judged based on what they did after being claimed, not prior.  Some had good careers before being a waiver claim, and did nothing with their new team. Those guys don’t count. This is what they did afterwards. Malcom Subban is worthy of consideration, but it’s still a bit fresh. I’d like to see how he finishes the season first. These are all 2006 to 2016 seasons.

Warning that there is a bit of satire below, but if you can't spot what it is, then I'm not going to tell you.

FORWARD

1) Chris Kunitz, 2005/06 Anaheim: The Winnipeg Jets let him go and he’s gone on to win 4 Stanley Cups. Maybe the Jets should have held on to this guy.

2) Rich Peverly, 2008/09 Winnipeg: The Jets claimed him from Nashville and he went on to score 124 PTS in 180 GP in a Jets jersey. The Jets then traded him to Boston for Blake Wheeler, and the rest is history. 

3) Craig Adams, 2008/09 Pittsburgh: The only guy on this list who won a Stanley Cup the season he was claimed. Do the Pens win the Cup without him? Maybe not. They shouldn’t have won the Cup that season anyway.

4) Michael Grabner, 2010/11 Islanders: Grabner scored 34 goals for the Islanders this season in one of the best offensive years for a recent waiver wire claim. He's gone on to score 140 NHL goals since being claimed.

5) Paul Byron, 2015/16 Montreal: Byron has scored 74 PTS in 175 GP for the Habs (and counting) after claiming him from Calgary.

6) Mark Recchi, 2007/08 Winnipeg: The Jets claimed him from Pittsburgh and he scored 40 PTS in 53 GP. Mark is the only Hall of Fame player on this list.

7) Dominic Moore, 2007/08 Toronto: In this stint with the Leafs he played 101 games scoring 55 PTS. That's good for a waiver add. The Leafs traded him to Buffalo the next season for a 2nd round pick.

8) Sean Avery, 2008/09 Rangers: Avery went on to play 178 games for the Rangers, scoring 70 PTS and racking up 389 PIMs. His personality was a perfect fit for that market.

9) Jeff Cowan, 2006/07 Vancouver: If you want to argue that 88 GP, 7 Goals, 11 PTS, 203 PIMs is not worthy of being on an “Allstar” list, that’s fine. But for a few of those 7 goals, some women threw their underwear out onto the ice. So yes, I’m putting “Cowan the Brabarian” on this list.

DEFENSE

1) Kyle Quincey, 2008/09 LA: This would be the best season of Quincey's career offensively with 38 PTS. It’s very rare to get this many blueline PTS from a waiver wire claim.

2) Thomas Hickey, 2012/13 Islanders: At the moment he was claimed, Hickey had not played a game in the NHL and was considered to be a huge draft bust. He has only played NHL games since then, accumulating 361 games with the Islanders thus far (and still counting).

3) David Schlemko, 2014/15 Calgary: He did not do much to help the Flames, playing 30 games scoring 1 point. Calgary did not sign him. Schlemko went to New Jersey and became a good defenseman.

4) Ron Hainsey, 2005/06 Columbus: Hainsey went on to score a decent 17 PTS in 55 GP. He had mostly played AHL at the moment he was claimed, and hasn't played in the AHL since.

GOAL

1. Ilya Bryzgalov, 2007/08 Phoenix: The Bryz played 55 games for Phoenix that season with a 2.42 GAA and .921 SV%. This was mostly a case of Anaheim having too many goalies and in the game of roster spot musical chairs, sometimes a good player loses.

2. Michael Leighton, 2009/10 Philly: He played 27 regular season games for the Flyers (2.48 GAA, .918 SV%) and 14 more games in the playoffs as the Flyers went to the finals. Because of the finals run, I’m putting Leighton over Malcom Subban for now.

Flaw in NHL Shot Suppression Statisitc

The modern age of NHL hockey has seen a rapid evolution of advanced statistics. We are entering a Golden Age of analytics. There are still flaws in some of the conclusions we are making from these metrics. One skill that current analytics does not properly value are defensive specialists. Players who specialize in preventing the other team's best players from scoring without providing much offense themselves will typically do very poorly in the "shot differential" battle, while still providing a useful service.

The term "shot suppression" in NHL statistics generally refers to "Corsi Against", or how many shots the other team averages per 60 minutes while a player is on the ice. If the opposing team averages more shots on goal while a specific player is on the ice, he is said to be bad at shot suppression. That appeals to our common sense. However, it is flawed in the context of line match-ups. If each line on a team averages the same amount of ice time against each line on the other team, then this suppression statistic is more valid. At the NHL level we see some notoriously complex line matching, where coaches attempt to deploy specific players against specific players.

If Player A gives up 40 shots per 60 minutes and Player B gives up 20 shots per 60m, we could say that Player B is twice as effective at suppressing shots. This might be correct, if A and B spend the same amount of time on the ice against the opponent’s top line(s). However, if A spent most of his time on the ice against Sidney Crosby and B spent most of his time on the ice against Riley Sheahan, then this "shot suppression" statistic is completely misleading.

Shot suppression should not be how well you do relative to your teammates. It should be how well you do relative to your opponent. Let's say the Crosby line averages 50 shots per 60 minutes and the Sheahan line averages 10. Then Player A allowed 10 fewer shots than his opponent averages and Player B allowed 10 more. In that context, we could say that Player A is twice as good at shot suppression. 

Does the opponent you are matched up against average more or less shots when you are on the ice? That's the true "Shot Suppression" statistic that I'd like to know. I'm not aware of anyone out there currently calculating this statistic.

Using Public Money For NHL Arena Construction

There are many people out there who hate the idea of public tax money being spent building new facilities for professional sports teams. I've listened to Bill Simmons and Malcom Gladwell repeatedly lament any tax revenue being used to subsidize some "rich guy's new toy". Recently plans to build a new arena in Calgary have seemingly collapsed while Ottawa could also benefit from a new facility downtown.

I'm less enthusiastic about tax money being used to fund 100% of the cost of a new facility, but if you can get the team owner to split the cost, then why not set terms and conditions on that public money? Instead of building a new arena, build a new state of the art community center that is also an arena. You can require the building to have certain things available for public recreation or municipal business. Perhaps you could build a high-performance training center for various youth sports, studio space for the arts, offices for Municipal departments, gym space, etc.

Require a certain amount of square footage dedicated to things the public can use for their enjoyment and betterment, and require a minimum number of hours that facility must be available for public use. Obviously, there is a cost issue involved as you want to add more functions to the building. You can't just build a mega-structure that has a home for every recreational endeavor (but that could be a future blog post). There will need to be a process by which the specific needs of the community are identified and prioritized, then planned out in the most efficient way possible. Maybe it starts with a simple "wish list".

I don't see this as taxpayers buying a rich guy a new toy, but rather an opportunity to get a rich guy to invest in a great new multi purpose community center that the local people will enjoy for years. This doesn't need to be seen as an evil thing. Tell the owner, we'll pay half, but here's what you have to do. There is a way to benefit both sides. Especially if Calgary intends to make another Olympic bid. That would give the owner a bit more leverage if the city suddenly needs a new rink.

Prepare a list of demands then get the rich guy to help you build what you want. There are so many things that you could require. Have the building designed so that it can also serve as an operations command center and refuge for people in the event of a natural disaster. If you're lucky enough to have a billionaire in your city willing to share the cost of building a new community center downtown, there's a way to make it happen.

Over-Estimating Value of NHL Corsi

We may have reached a point in the NHL community where Corsi (or shot differential +/-) is being over-used in analyzing performance. If you take all the players who played in both 2015/16 and 2016/17, there is only a 0.25 (or 25%) correlation between Corsi For % from one season to the next. How many shots on goal an individual player gets per game is 80% correlated year over year, +/- is at 20%. There is a troubling amount of randomness in individual Corsi. Shot differential while a player is on the ice is more a function of the other players around him and the sum of the situations he's placed in by the coaches.

Think about it this way, for most of a game a player is 1 of 12 on the ice. How much of an impact does each really have on the shot totals? I believe there are only a small number of players on each team who actually drive possession, and everyone else is just along for the ride making a minimal contribution to the shot clock. It's probably something like 25% of the players have a meaningful impact on shot differential, the other parts are interchangeable.

One group frequently that frequently gets overrated by Corsi is bottom pairing defenseman, where defensive defensemen who play some of the most difficult minutes will often have a poor Corsi For. The bottom pairing defensemen get to play their ice time against the bottom forward lines from the other team, where the defensive guy will often play against the best opposing forwards. A common roster mistake made by teams who place extra emphasis on shot differential is to replace the low Corsi guys playing tougher minutes with a high Corsi guy playing easier minutes. Then when the "analytics darling" gets put into tougher situations, he can't handle it.


I do think that there can be some usefulness to shot differential statistics, if viewed in the proper context, comparing players who play in similar situations. When I see that Drew Doughty or Patrice Bergeron has a consistently high Corsi For, that makes sense. The two most important Corsi For percentages on your roster should be the #1 Defenseman and the #1 Center. I do care how those players affect the shots on goal battle. But if you're going to use Corsi to promote or demote players up and down the line-up, be warned that it's a slippery slope. 

Have NHL Teams Committed Insurance Fraud?

Over the past few NHL seasons, there have been a few suspicious moves involving Long Term Injured Reserve, where some players with bad contracts have been labelled unable to play indefinitely. There has yet to be any actionable evidence of healthy players being placed on LTIR to circumvent the salary cap, until it appeared that Joffrey Lupul was one such case thanks to a social media post. He has since back tracked on his original words in a statement that was likely crafted by lawyers.

If it's true that Lupul is healthy and has been healthy for a while, then he better not have been collecting insurance money. If he was healthy last year and collected any injury insurance, guess what, that's a crime. If he knew he was healthy and collected payouts, Lupul would be guilty of a crime. He made an Instagram post that could have implicated himself in insurance fraud.

I was a bit surprised that the NHL ordered an independent evaluation of Lupul's health. It seemed like something they'd rather just go away, instead of risking Lupul being pronounced fully healthy and exposing one of it's teams possibly being guilty of fraud. Even if it's a small probability he passes the physical, it would open a Pandora's Box. I'd want to be listening to sportstalk radio in Toronto if that news broke.

Ordering Lupul to take a new independent physical is probably the smartest thing for the NHL to do from a legal perspective. If any insurance fraud did take place, the league will not want to seem complicit. If he fails the physical, everything is fine and there's nothing to see here. I'll be fascinated to see how Bettman responds if Lupul is deemed 100% healthy. He'll probably have to punish the Leafs and his old friend Lou Lamoriello...

And please guys, make sure it's a truly independent Doctor who conducts this. Don't send James Woods from Any Given Sunday....

Also, here's something I wrote about Marian Hossa LTIR cap recapture circumvention.

Marian Hossa Cap Recapture Circumvention Theory

I'm not a Doctor. Let me start there. News broke today that 38 year old Marian Hossa is allergic to hockey equipment and will eventually be placed on the Chicago Blackhawks long term injured reserve, probably ending his career. Apparently they can't order special equipment that he's not allergic to. He's allergic to all equipment. Once upon a time I got rashes from hockey equipment. It's called Eczema. It's common and easy to treat. They haven't said what Hossa's condition is, so it could be more severe than what I had.

I'm not disputing that Hossa has a medical condition. I'm sure he does. Everybody has something that can cause discomfort. The part that arouses my suspicion is the timing. Hossa is one of those players who signed a 10+ year contract that was front loaded with a back dive to circumvent the salary cap. The idea is that the player retires when the salary flatlines and he gets paid more for a lower cap hit. It was deemed illegal in the 2013 CBA. That CBA even went so far as to add a significant "cap recapture" penalty to punish all those teams who circumvented the rules. Chicago was one of them. The Blackhawks are jammed tight up against the cap for the next few seasons. Had Hossa retired when he originally planned to retire at age 38, it would have hurt the team baldly. Hossa going on LTI instead of retiring helps them substantially.

Was Hossa not already planning to retire at age 38 when his actual salary dropped from $7M to $1M? The team would have been painfully aware of what his impending retirement would mean for a roster already projected to be over next year's cap. This is not an injury that is preventing him from playing. He's saying that the discomfort has become too much and it's not worth it to him to continue his career. Isn't that why most athletes retire? Their health starts to falter later in their career and they retire when it's no longer worth it to them. He's already proven he can play just fine despite the ailment. I'm not sure why Chicago should get to circumvent the cap recapture penalty because Hossa is ostensibly retiring.

It's possible that Hossa always intended to play out the back dive and I'm just an insensitive jerk who loves conspiracy theories. Maybe they did not just look for whatever was "most wrong" with him and use it as an excuse to LTI him instead of facing a cap recapture penalty. Maybe it's just me.

Somehow though, I think that the other "back dive" contracts out there that are illegal under today's rules, might produce similar career ending ailments. Let me make a few predictions...

Henrik Zetterberg, 2018 - painful foot blisters
Roberto Luongo 2019 - hurt feelings
Jeff Carter 2020 - virulent jock itch
Duncan Keith 2020 - paralyzing case of athlete's foot
Jon Quick 2020 - sore groin
Shea Weber 2022 - shin splints
Ryan Suter 2022 - hamstring pull
Zach Parise 2022 - aching feet

Does NHL Shot Differential Matter?

If you have been following the evolution of the hockey analytics community, you’ll notice we have come to a place where many of these people strongly believe that shot differential is the most important measure of the value of hockey players. Putting grades on trades and other transactions only requires an examination of Corsi and its derivatives. They’ll say things like this was a terrible trade because the player has a bad Relative Corsi Against.

I’m a hockey stats nerd who wants to see the hockey analytics revolution succeed, but I have always been skeptical of “shots at goal plus minus” (aka Corsi) as a meaningful statistic. They call it a “possession” statistic, but it doesn’t actually count how long a team is in possession of the puck, and it assumes that all shots are created equal.

Placing ultimate importance on shot differential assumes that it actually matters which team gets the most total shots with no measure of quality of shooting location. It begs the question, how often does the team that shoots the most shots win the hockey game? A smart hockey brain might say something like 65%. If it were 50%, then the final shot differential would have no impact on the outcome of the game. I looked at a random sample of 1100 NHL games, and the team with the most shots won 50.9% of the games. In the playoffs it drops to 40%.

Hold on a minute, getting more shots in the regular season only increases the probability of winning by 1%? In the playoffs the losing team tends to get the most shots? In the 2016 NHL playoffs the 5 games with the largest shot differentials saw the losing team get the most shots (top being Washington losing with 44 shots to Philly’s 11). If shot differential is so important, why doesn’t it have a more positive effect on wins and loses?

There are possible theories. Such as, many teams play differently when they are leading or trailing on the scoreboard. They may hold an extra forward back to box out the middle and limit shots from best percentage scoring areas. In doing so they would hinder their own team’s shot production by attempting to limit the opponent’s opportunities. This would hurt the Corsi ratings for the players who are winning, while teams playing from behind take more risks and shoot more shots (though not always from higher value locations), thus giving the perception of greater value. It’s a theory.

Corsi is a flawed rating system that rewards quantity of shots over quality of shots. It gives players greater value to pepper the net with shots from everywhere instead of making extra passes to get the puck into a higher percentage scoring location. Goals are a function of quality scoring chances more so than quantity of shots. A shot from the red line has the same Corsi value as a breakaway. I never understood why Corsi is supposed to be a better judge of value than regular old fashioned plus minus. Perhaps the sample size is smaller for goals, but goals data is far more important than shots data. I would much rather know who was on the ice for every goal rather than who was on the ice for every shot.

If normal plus minus does not provide us with enough information, then Corsi supplies us with too much. Perhaps the optimal statistic is waiting untapped in the middle of these two extremes. Quality Scoring Chance Plus Minus. That would require a precise definition of quality scoring chance and people to count them, but would be a superior measure of value. In the proper context shot differential and Corsi can tell a story, but should not be the primary statistic for assigning value. Because if the Florida Panthers think they got a quality asset in Jakub Kindl, this Red Wings fan will tell you, don’t hold your breath…

10 New Statistics For The NHL

As we enter the modern age of hockey statistics analytics, we need to start tracking more detailed stats. The list of stats they track seems to grow every year, so here is my list of statistics I'd like to see. They may have already started counting some of these, and if so, great! The more things we count in hockey, the happier I'll be.


1) Passes: Okay NHL, it is 2016. Let's start counting passes for individual players with complete V incomplete. If we really care about "possession statistics" we should be counting passes. Logistically it's difficult to do because there are so many passes over the course of a hockey game, but we have the technology.

2) Shot Assists: Why not give out a maximum of 1 Shot Assist for every shot on goal? It would add a substantial amount of information to our "playmaker statistics". If we tracked shot assists and pass completion %, it would help us better identify the league's best playmakers.

3) Quality Scoring Chance Plus Minus: Instead of using Corsi (shots at net plus minus) as a defining measure value where all shots are created equal, it would be optimal to restrict it to shots on net from the highest percentage scoring locations. I don't currently know if anyone has thought of this idea before, but if not can we name it after me?

4) Face-off Assists: When a center wins a face-off because a teammate won the ensuing puck battle thus gaining possession, give the guy an assist. This could be classified as a possession statistic and would be valuable for teams seeking to improve their face-off win %.

5) Intercepted Passes: Both offensively and defensively, but I'm most curious to know which NHL players intercept the most passes. Interceptions is a big stat in the NFL that they could have in the NHL (though they happen with far greater frequency in hockey). This would also be a possession statistic

6) Hits Creating Turnovers: Why not give the NHL's heavy hitters their own possession statistic? If a hit creates a turnover, count it. The best kind of hit is the one that forces a change of puck possession and it would be great to know who in the NHL does this the most.

7) Forced Turnovers: For me the biggest problem with turnover stats is that they only count giveaways and takeaways when they should be counting every defensive play that forces a change of possession. They can come in different categories (takeaways, from hits, intercepted passes, etc) but all sum into a comprehensive Forced Turnover statistic. For each defensive forced turnover there is an offensive turnover that must also be counted.

8) Shot Coordinates: Turn the hockey rink into a Cartesian plane with an X and Y axis and let us know the X, Y coordinates of every shot on net. This will give us much better understanding of the quality of shot attempts. I'm sure this is already done somewhere; I just don't know where to find it.

9) Primary Assist: This one will have to be subjective, but only give out 1 Primary Assist for the one player who touched the puck in the sequence leading to a goal, deserving the most credit for the goal. The last player to touch the puck isn't always the guy who made the more difficult pass.

10) Extra Assists: We can stop at two assists for the purposes of Points, but you can still count all the other players who touched the puck in the sequence and put them in their own category. Technically they assisted on the goal and may have made a more difficult pass than the next guy. Why not let us know?

Changing sweaters does change D man

Today at www.tsn.ca hockey analytics writer Travis Yost wrote an article titled "changing sweaters doesn't change the D man" were he attempts to prove exactly that in terms of relative Corsi,(change in team's shot differential when he's on or off the ice). He's trying to refute the claim that relative Corsi changes significantly when a player is moved from one team to another. Evidently he takes a lot of flak for criticizing trades based primarily on relative Corsi. I'm assuming this flak can get pretty nasty, otherwise TSN would allow comments below his piece.

If you want to read the entire article there is a link above. I would like to respond specifically to the analysis portion included below.

If you were to believe the “all the player needs is an environmental change” argument, you would think that driving play for a defender is not a repeatable skill, simply because it would collapse like a house of cards the moment a player changed teams.

So, let’s test that theory. Let’s look at the RelativeCorsi% of every single defender who logged two seasons with one team, then changed teams and logged another pair of seasons. We’ll do this for every two-season sample from 2007-08 through this season. And we’ll also adjust for zone starts to control for players at the ends of the spectrum who either logged lofty offensive zone minutes or tough defensive zone minutes.

First, did the player’s skill repeat across different teams?

If RelativeCorsi% was purely indicative of team effects, we would expect this to be pretty flat. Instead, we see repeatability even across different teams and different seasons. Those players who favourably drive play with one team continue to do so with another team; those players who get shelled on the shot clock with one team continue to do so with another team.

How he came to this final conclusion is flawed. He says that if individual contribution to relative Corsi were nothing and team effect were everything, the line would be flat. The problem is, just because it isn't flat does NOT mean there is a strong correlation. The R^2 for that data is only 0.27. With truly predictive statistics, the data will fit very tightly to the line (by comparison, player point per game production from one season to the next has an R^2 of roughly 0.68 (for players playing over 20 game in each season)).  The data set in the Yost rant has significant variability, enough to prevent any substantive conclusion. His argument seems to be "because it is not 0%, it must be 100%." All this data shows you is a weak positive relationship, nothing more, nothing less. He's making strong definitive conclusions based on weak correlation.

The bottom line is that any given player 5 on 5 is just one of 10 skaters on the ice. His impact, positive or negative, is somewhere around 10%. Some players directly affect the games more than others, but shot differential is heavily influenced by who you are playing with and who you are playing against. Relative Corsi Against might be a useful statistic for certain players in the right context, but would you agree that Josh Manson and Fedor Tyutin are the best defensemen in the NHL? Corsi is loaded with false positives and false negatives, and distinguishing between the two is far more complicated than you might think.

More on that here

What's Wrong With Corsi?

In recent years the NHL has been undergoing a "statistical revolution" with the introduction of advanced analytics. Among the most heralded of these statistics is Corsi, which attempts to estimate puck possession with a form of "shots at goal plus/minus". While I agree that these analytics can be useful when put in the proper context, they can lead to poor decisions when trusted too much. Sometimes Shots at Goal Plus Minus can give you a better understanding of a player's contribution to team success, but not always.

If you look at the leaderboard of best and worst Corsi, something doesn't pass the eyeball test. I am a Detroit Red Wings fan who has been starved for a true #1 defenseman ever since the retirement of Niklas Lidstrom. A player you can play against the other team's best player and win the game. They have still not replaced that void, making them mediocre at best despite a talented group of forwards. Niklas Kronwall and Danny DeKeyser are often forced to face tougher assignments than they should, and they have a bad Corsi. Brendan Smith and Jakub Kindl are their 6th and 7th defensemen, and they have great Corsi. At least until they dumped Kindl for next to nothing.

Anyone who watches the games knows that if you put Smith and Kindl on the top line to play against the other team's best players, the results would be catastrophic at best. But I'm sure some analytics analyst out there has written a post somewhere that Detroit could be a Cup contender if they played Kindl and Smith 20+ minutes a night.  It's ridiculous, but without the proper context, how do you know?

I think team Corsi might be a better indicator than individual Corsi (even though not all shots are created equal). Individual Corsi is too much swayed by the other 9 skaters on the ice to say this is what this player is responsible for. A writer for TSN recently wrote that Florida won the Gudbranson trade by a wide margin because he had a bad relative Corsi against, meaning his team gives up more shots than usual when he's on the ice. If we used relative Corsi against to measure the quality of a defenseman, then 3 of the worst D in the NHL are Brent Seabrook, Dan Girardi, and Roman Josi (who most experts will tell you are pretty good). It also has the two best defensemen as Josh Manson and Fedor Tyutin. Don't panic just yet Canucks fans.

All these stats are significantly affected by who else is on the ice. If you play a great D with a terrible D, one guy gets his numbers dragged down, the other dragged up. You need to be able to identify the false positives and false negatives, because there are many. Too many. To those NHL teams out there who are going down this rabbit hole, be warned if you can't properly distinguish between the right and the wrong, it will lead to some very costly mistakes and comical blunders. Proceed at your own peril.

NHL Defensemen Goals Against Average 2014/15

Have you ever wondered what the Goals Against Average is for NHL defensemen per 60 minutes of ice time, much how we measure quality of play for goaltenders. The difference is that for defensemen, I'm only looking at even strength goals against. Not all defensemen kill penalties, but all goalies kill penalties.




We are currently at the 1/4 mark of the 2014/15 season, and here are the stats for all defensemen with at least 10 Games Played.

Player	Team	GP	GA	TOI/GP	GAA/60
Patrick Wiercioch	OTT	15	3	16.5	0.73
Sergei Gonchar	MTL	10	3	19.2	0.94
David Rundblad	CHI	11	2	10.9	1.00
Ian Cole	STL	24	7	15.6	1.12
Niklas Hjalmarsson	CHI	24	11	22.0	1.25
Carl Gunnarsson	STL	17	6	16.8	1.26
Joe Morrow	BOS	14	5	17.0	1.26
Kevin Shattenkirk	STL	24	12	22.6	1.33
Grant Clitsome	WPG	16	5	14.1	1.33
Christian Ehrhoff	PIT	24	12	21.9	1.37
Lubomir Visnovsky	NYI	17	8	20.0	1.41
Jonas Brodin	MIN	14	8	23.7	1.44
Trevor Van Riemsdyk	CHI	18	6	13.5	1.48
Simon Despres	PIT	23	8	14.1	1.48
Alec Martinez	LAK	18	9	19.7	1.53
Adam Pardy	WPG	13	5	15.0	1.54
John-Michael Liles	CAR	17	8	18.2	1.55
Mattias Ekholm	NSH	24	11	17.7	1.56
Paul Postma	WPG	25	9	13.6	1.58
Jason Demers	SJS	20	10	18.2	1.65
John Klingberg	DAL	11	7	22.8	1.68
Nikita Zadorov	BUF	14	7	17.6	1.70
Ryan Ellis	NSH	24	13	18.8	1.73
Brayden McNabb	LAK	25	12	16.7	1.73
Jakub Kindl	DET	20	9	15.6	1.74
Torey Krug	BOS	22	13	20.1	1.76
Shea Weber	NSH	24	19	26.8	1.77
Matt Hunwick	NYR	22	12	17.7	1.85
Nate Schmidt	WSH	24	11	14.8	1.85
Jared Spurgeon	MIN	18	14	24.7	1.89
Eric Gelinas	NJD	20	11	17.5	1.89
Roman Josi	NSH	24	20	26.4	1.90
Kevan Miller	BOS	11	6	17.1	1.91
Adam Larsson	NJD	17	9	16.5	1.93
Chris Phillips	OTT	19	14	22.8	1.94
Johnny Oduya	CHI	24	16	20.5	1.95
Tom Gilbert	MTL	24	15	19.3	1.95
Ryan Suter	MIN	23	22	29.3	1.96
Dennis Wideman	CGY	25	19	23.2	1.97
Michal Rozsival	CHI	15	8	16.2	1.98
Jake Muzzin	LAK	19	15	23.2	2.05
Nick Leddy	NYI	25	17	19.9	2.05
Raphael Diaz	CGY	10	4	11.7	2.05
Francois Beauchemin	ANA	18	14	22.7	2.05
Marc-Edouard Vlasic	SJS	26	20	22.5	2.06
Kris Russell	CGY	24	19	23.0	2.07
Zach Trotman	BOS	11	6	15.8	2.07
Andrej Sustr	TBL	23	13	16.3	2.08
Mark Streit	PHI	24	19	22.8	2.08
Dmitry Kulikov	FLA	19	15	22.6	2.10
Marco Scandella	MIN	21	16	21.7	2.11
Brendan Smith	DET	19	13	19.4	2.11
Brian Campbell	FLA	23	19	23.1	2.14
Hampus Lindholm	ANA	26	21	22.5	2.15
Tim Erixon	CBJ	18	11	17.0	2.15
Duncan Keith	CHI	24	22	25.4	2.16
Adam McQuaid	BOS	20	14	19.4	2.16
Nathan Beaulieu	MTL	14	7	13.8	2.17
Aaron Ekblad	FLA	23	18	21.6	2.18
Clayton Stoner	ANA	20	13	17.9	2.18
Josh Manson	ANA	14	10	19.6	2.19
Nick Schultz	PHI	23	16	18.9	2.21
TJ Brodie	CGY	26	24	25.1	2.21
Mike Green	WSH	19	14	19.9	2.22
Erik Gudbranson	FLA	23	15	17.6	2.23
Drew Doughty	LAK	25	27	28.9	2.24
Olli Maatta	PIT	18	14	20.6	2.27
Jacob Trouba	WPG	25	22	23.3	2.27
Danny DeKeyser	DET	24	19	20.8	2.28
Alexei Emelin	MTL	24	20	21.9	2.29
Alexander Edler	VAN	25	23	24.1	2.30
Cody Ceci	OTT	24	18	19.5	2.31
Keith Yandle	ARI	26	25	24.6	2.34
Dylan Olsen	FLA	22	14	16.2	2.35
Mark Giordano	CGY	26	25	24.3	2.37
Brad Stuart	COL	14	11	19.9	2.37
Scott Hannan	SJS	19	12	16.0	2.38
Paul Martin	PIT	24	21	22.1	2.38
Cam Fowler	ANA	25	21	21.1	2.39
Toby Enstrom	WPG	22	22	25.1	2.39
Damon Severson	NJD	25	23	23.1	2.39
Anton Volchenkov	NSH	20	11	13.8	2.39
Seth Jones	NSH	24	17	17.8	2.39
Ryan Stanton	VAN	15	9	15.0	2.40
Robyn Regehr	LAK	22	17	19.3	2.40
Stephane Robidas	TOR	23	16	17.3	2.42
Zach Bogosian	WPG	24	22	22.7	2.42
Anton Stralman	TBL	26	24	22.8	2.43
Mark Stuart	WPG	25	20	19.7	2.44
Mirco Mueller	SJS	21	15	17.5	2.46
Kyle Quincey	DET	20	15	18.3	2.46
Andrei Markov	MTL	26	26	24.4	2.46
Rasmus Ristolainen	BUF	25	20	19.5	2.46
Brett Bellemore	CAR	13	8	15.0	2.46
John Moore	NYR	18	12	16.2	2.46
Jason Garrison	TBL	26	23	21.3	2.49
Nate Guenin	COL	19	13	16.4	2.51
Barret Jackman	STL	24	17	16.9	2.51
Matthew Carle	TBL	26	24	21.8	2.54
Marek Zidlicky	NJD	25	23	21.7	2.55
Christopher Tanev	VAN	25	22	20.6	2.56
Justin Braun	SJS	26	24	21.5	2.58
James Wisniewski	CBJ	21	20	22.0	2.60
P.K. Subban	MTL	26	28	24.8	2.61
Kris Letang	PIT	22	24	25.1	2.61
Michael Stone	ARI	26	22	19.3	2.63
Mark Borowiecki	OTT	19	13	15.5	2.64
Thomas Hickey	NYI	24	20	18.8	2.65
Dion Phaneuf	TOR	24	25	23.3	2.68
Tim Gleason	CAR	22	16	16.2	2.69
Tyler Myers	BUF	24	27	25.1	2.69
Dougie Hamilton	BOS	26	26	22.3	2.69
Johnny Boychuk	NYI	21	21	22.2	2.71
Jay Bouwmeester	STL	20	21	23.2	2.71
Eric Gryba	OTT	24	16	14.7	2.73
Ron Hainsey	CAR	23	21	20.1	2.73
Matt Niskanen	WSH	24	24	22.0	2.73
Morgan Rielly	TOR	23	19	18.1	2.74
Erik Johnson	COL	24	26	23.6	2.76
Rob Scuderi	PIT	24	19	17.2	2.76
Jake Gardiner	TOR	22	20	19.8	2.76
Matt Bartkowski	BOS	13	11	18.3	2.77
Brent Burns	SJS	26	28	23.3	2.77
David Schlemko	ARI	14	11	16.8	2.81
Sami Vatanen	ANA	26	27	22.1	2.82
Yannick Weber	VAN	20	15	15.9	2.83
Matt Greene	LAK	25	20	16.9	2.84
Brent Seabrook	CHI	24	25	21.8	2.87
Willie Mitchell	FLA	23	25	22.7	2.88
Alex Pietrangelo	STL	24	30	25.8	2.90
Jay Harrison	CAR	16	13	16.8	2.91
Dan Girardi	NYR	24	29	24.9	2.92
Andy Greene	NJD	25	29	23.7	2.94
Ryan McDonagh	NYR	13	15	23.5	2.95
Kevin Klein	NYR	23	20	17.7	2.95
Tyson Barrie	COL	25	26	20.9	2.99
Niklas Kronwall	DET	24	29	24.3	2.99
Kevin Bieksa	VAN	25	27	21.6	3.00
Zach Redmond	COL	14	12	17.0	3.03
Radko Gudas	TBL	22	19	17.0	3.04
Karl Alzner	WSH	24	23	18.9	3.04
Erik Karlsson	OTT	24	34	27.8	3.06
Justin Schultz	EDM	24	27	21.9	3.08
Marc Staal	NYR	24	28	22.5	3.11
Luca Sbisa	VAN	20	19	18.3	3.11
Mike Weber	BUF	22	19	16.6	3.12
Matt Dumba	MIN	20	13	12.5	3.12
Nicklas Grossmann	PHI	24	23	18.4	3.13
Martin Marincin	EDM	12	11	17.5	3.14
John Carlson	WSH	24	29	23.1	3.14
David Savard	CBJ	24	28	22.2	3.15
Jon Merrill	NJD	11	12	20.7	3.16
Eric Brewer	TBL	17	16	17.8	3.17
Mark Fayne	EDM	25	23	17.3	3.18
Dan Hamhuis	VAN	20	22	20.6	3.20
Brenden Dillon	DAL	20	22	20.6	3.20
Calvin de Haan	NYI	21	22	19.6	3.21
Dennis Seidenberg	BOS	26	31	22.3	3.22
Jonathan Ericsson	DET	24	26	20.1	3.24
Andrew Ference	EDM	22	24	20.2	3.24
Tyson Strachan	BUF	15	16	19.6	3.26
Travis Hamonic	NYI	21	24	21.0	3.26
Zbynek Michalek	ARI	26	30	21.1	3.28
Andrej Meszaros	BUF	17	18	19.2	3.31
Cody Franson	TOR	22	25	20.4	3.34
Andrew MacDonald	PHI	13	15	20.7	3.34
Jan Hejda	COL	25	30	21.3	3.38
Roman Polak	TOR	21	25	21.1	3.39
Michael Del Zotto	PHI	22	26	20.7	3.43
Connor Murphy	ARI	25	23	16.1	3.44
Mike Weaver	MTL	24	21	15.2	3.45
Oliver Ekman-Larsson	ARI	26	39	26.0	3.46
Matt Irwin	SJS	13	13	17.3	3.47
Andrej Sekera	CAR	23	30	22.6	3.47
Alex Goligoski	DAL	25	36	24.7	3.50
Fedor Tyutin	CBJ	16	19	20.3	3.51
Josh Gorges	BUF	18	23	21.8	3.51
Ladislav Smid	CGY	24	21	14.9	3.53
Nick Holden	COL	25	30	20.2	3.56
Justin Faulk	CAR	24	34	23.8	3.57
Jordie Benn	DAL	21	26	20.6	3.60
Nikita Nikitin	EDM	21	27	20.9	3.70
Keith Ballard	MIN	11	9	13.2	3.72
Jamie Oleksiak	DAL	19	14	11.9	3.73
Nate Prosser	MIN	19	17	14.4	3.74
Brooks Orpik	WSH	24	33	21.6	3.81
Dalton Prout	CBJ	21	24	17.7	3.88
Andre Benoit	BUF	16	21	20.2	3.90
Brian Strait	NYI	15	18	18.4	3.91
Jeff Petry	EDM	24	32	20.2	3.96
Deryk Engelland	CGY	21	20	14.2	4.01
Trevor Daley	DAL	25	42	24.5	4.11
Braydon Coburn	PHI	12	18	20.0	4.51
Jared Cowen	OTT	19	28	18.7	4.74
Luke Schenn	PHI	19	25	16.4	4.83
Jack Johnson	CBJ	21	41	23.6	4.96
Bryce Salvador	NJD	15	24	18.5	5.19