Showing posts with label NHL Teams Best/Worst Contracts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NHL Teams Best/Worst Contracts. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 8, 2020

San Jose Sharks Best Contracts (2005-2020)

The following is a condensed preview of the San Jose Sharks chapter of my new book, Hunting Bargains in a Salary Cap World. If you purchase the book, you will receive a much more in-depth analysis of all these contracts, including year-by-year statistics, a customized “basket of comparables”, and memorable quotes from players, GMs, and coaches. There is a chapter about how to calculate Expected Free Agent Value, which is used to determine precisely how much any given player was over/under paid each season; breaking down the econometrics of each deal in addition to discussing how each treaty came to pass.

Below is just a tiny sample of what’s in the book, with a few sentences clipped from the summaries. These are the graphics that appear in the book.



San Jose Sharks

There’s a case to be made that the San Jose Sharks have been the most successful team in the salary cap era to never win a Stanley Cup. In 15 years, they have made the playoffs 13 times, advancing past the first round 9 times. Joe Thornton, Patrick Marleau, and eventually Brent Burns, Logan Couture, and Joe Pavelski have been the key cogs of that success, driving the team’s impressive performance (those 5 players inked 9 of the team’s best 15 deals).



Brent Burns started this contract playing forward. When he was moved back to the blueline, he suddenly evolved into one of the league’s best offensive defensemen. Brent celebrated his 30th birthday at the end of year three and rather than start a downward trend, he got even better in year four, earning his first Norris trophy nomination after scoring 74 PTS (plus an addition 24 PTS in the playoffs helping the Sharks to the Stanley Cup final). He would win the Norris trophy in year five. Any money he might have left on the table from this deal got thrown in the pile for his next jackpot.


Pavelski scored 237 PTS in 286 GP (68-point pace) with a +53, including a career high 41 goals and 79 PTS in year four (which for 2014 was the 2nd lowest non-entry level AAV of players with over 75 PTS). The Sharks ostensibly got an $8M center for $5.2M. This was a bit risky from Pavelski’s perspective, as he sold 2 UFA years at a discount and expired when he was 29-years-old. Fortunately he aged well and earned another big pay day.


Year one proved to be Tomas Hertl's break-out year, scoring 35 goals and 74 PTS (helping me win a fantasy hockey championship). Year two was derailed by injury, but he still managed an impressive 36 PTS in 48 GP while the Sharks season was in a tailspin. If the Sharks decide their championship window has slammed shut after their disastrous 2020, this contract would absolutely fetch a big return if Wilson put him on the market, 2 years away from UFA.

Joe Thornton had already begun a downward trend from his 127-point apex in 2006, but the slope was gradual enough that the Sharks still received 83 PTS per 82 GP over this span. He was among the highest paid forwards in the league throughout, so this wasn’t exactly a bargain, but he was still among the league’s most dominant centers. 


It’s entire plausible that Pavelski was more concerned with staying in San Jose than he was with maximizing career earnings. Joe produced 164 Goals and 346 PTS in 402 GP, plus an additional 44 PTS in 53 playoff games. The center even received Selke Trophy votes throughout these years, though never won. 


This proved to be an incredible bargain for the Sharks, as Logan Couture would score 32 goals and 66 PTS per 82 GP for 50 cents on the dollar. Had the Sharks given their young pivot the same 11-year contract as Jeff Carter, they would have ultimately saved some money in the long-term, as Couture would collect 13 years and $94M on his next 2 contracts.


In August 2009 Doug Wilson was under pressure to shed salary in order to get his payroll under the cap. He decided to ship off Ehrhoff and Brad Lukowich to the Canucks for 2 busted prospects (it was becoming clear by that point that Patrick White was a bust). It proved to be a terrible transaction for the Sharks, as Ehrhoff had considerable success with the Canucks, scoring 50 PTS in 2011, with 12 more PTS in the playoffs helping them to the Stanley Cup final. 

Marleau’s production quickly jumped to a higher level when Joe Thornton came to town, scoring a career high 86 PTS in year one. That output dipped down to 48 PTS by year three, when he could have been UFA but chose to stay in San Jose on a 2-year deal. His agent couldn’t have liked that, bypassing a potentially giant pay day. 


 This was signed on July 1st, and many of his peers went unsigned into September before everyone realized that some variation of the front dive was the best compromise. It guarantees a much higher minimum salary on the next deal. Timo did have a disappointing year one with 49 PTS in 70 GP (down from 66 PTS in 2019), but so did the rest of the team. Expect him to bounce back.


The salary proved to be a bargain, with Martin Jones providing 60+ games per season of slightly above average goaltending for the price of a #2 guy. Jones played 190 games with 102 wins, 68 losses and a .915 SV%; also playing 40 playoff games with a .926 SV%, coming 2 wins short of the 2016 Stanley Cup. You can read about his next treaty on the Sharks worst contracts list.


Joe Thornton’s production had been trending downwards for a few years, but it leveled off into a respectable plateau in the 70-point range for 6 seasons after his 30th birthday. Jumbo repeatedly bet on himself throughout his 30s, and there was always another pot of gold at the end of each rainbow. There are not too many examples of “bet on yourself” that have unfolded this positively for players over the age of 30. 


Logan Couture scored at a rate of 32 goals and 66 PTS per 82 GP, and inked a 5-year extension at a very reasonable price. Over the 5 years of this contract, Logan averaged 29 goals and 64 PTS per 82 GP in the regular season, but posted far more spectacular numbers in the playoffs, where he popped 65 PTS in 60 GP.


Doug Wilson was great at convincing players to accept his terms in order to “help” the team win, and Marleau certainly made a significant contribution to the team’s success, scoring 154 PTS in 158 GP, plus an additional 16 PTS in 20 playoff GP. Patty signed another bridge at age 30 when this expired. San Jose sure sounds like a great place to live.

 

Once Vlasic was signed, the scoring rate started to climb, thanks in part to an increase in PP time. Marc produced a career high 39 PTS in 67 GP in year three (a 48-point pace). In total, he averaged 32 PTS per 82 GP, posting an incredible +71 over this span. Any money he left on the table was added to his next deal, which you can read about on the Sharks worst contracts list.



It’s incredibly rare for a player with 50+ PTS to get paid a salary this low, the nearest being Reilly Smith accepting $1.7M (adjusted for cap inflation) from the Bruins in 2014 after scoring 51 PTS. The Sharks had a disastrous season, and Labanc personally dropped from 56 PTS down to 33 PTS. Arguably this may not belong here as Labanc experienced a scoring regression, but it was included due to the rarity of the Wilson’s accomplishment.

 


Monday, December 7, 2020

Los Angeles Kings Best Contracts (2005-2020)

The following is a condensed preview of the Los Angeles Kings chapter of my new book, Hunting Bargains in a Salary Cap World. If you purchase the book, you will receive a much more in-depth analysis of all these contracts, including year-by-year statistics, a customized “basket of comparables”, and memorable quotes from players, GMs, and coaches. There is a chapter about how to calculate Expected Free Agent Value, which is used to determine precisely how much any given player was over/under paid each season; breaking down the econometrics of each deal in addition to discussing how each treaty came to pass.

Below is just a tiny sample of what’s in the book, with a few sentences clipped from the summaries. These are the graphics that appear in the book.



Los Angeles Kings

 The last 15 years of Los Angeles Kings hockey has been a story of peaks and valleys, with the heights reaching the ultimate apex with 2 Stanley Cup championships. Dean Lombardi was the architect of those titles, but was fired 3 years after the 2nd Cup, having missed the playoffs twice in that span. You might expect that a pair of titles would give a GM more leeway when the franchise struggles, but this is a performance-based industry and Lombardi failed to grow the burgeoning dynasty.


Drew Doughty agreed to an 8-year term when he could have been UFA in 4, which is where Lombardi really scored the bargain. It was worth every penny. Year one, Stanley Cup. Year three, Stanley Cup. Year five, Norris trophy. Doughty would average 46 PTS per 82 GP and nearly 27 minutes per game of ice time.


Over these 7 years, Anze Kopitar scored 480 PTS in 538 GP (plus another 64 PTS in 75 playoff GP), finished top 4 in Selke trophy voting 4 times, winning the award 2016. Oh, and the Kings won 2 Stanley Cups. Lombardi did buy 3 years of unrestricted free agency, but the money that Kopitar left on the table got stacked onto his next deal (there’s a theme emerging here).

 

It didn’t take long for the upside to start showing itself, as Jonathan quickly improved in year one, winning 35 games, losing 22, with a .918 SV%. Then one year after Tim Thomas stole the Stanley Cup for the Bruins, Jonathan went on an epic run of his own, playing 69 games with a 1.95 GAA and .929 SV% in the regular season, then won 16 out of 20 playoff games with an astounding .946 SV% to win both the Cup and the Conn Smythe trophy.

 

Over these 451 regular season games, Dusty threw 1546 hits (this will be addressed on the Kings worst contracts list), and scored 276 PTS (50-point pace). The most important of all his personal accolades, his name was engraved on the Stanley Cup twice, scoring 14 playoff goals in those 2 runs. Does the rest even matter?

 

The Kings won the Stanley Cup in year one, but were so dominant that none of the series went to 7 games. Justin Williams contributed 15 PTS to that title. They won another championship in year three where Williams scored 25 PTS and was named playoff MVP. Justin scored 19 goals over their 2 Cup runs. Do his regular season stats even matter?

 

The move to sign Jake Muzzin early would save the Kings millions, as Jake had a breakout 41-point season before the new deal even started, and would have commanded a much higher price had they waited. Lombardi bought a 40-point defenseman for 70 cents on the dollar. In year four he was traded to the Toronto Maple Leafs for a 1st round pick and some prospects.

 

Alexander Frolov scored a career high 71 PTS in year two, averaging 65 PTS per 82 GP over the duration. Unfortunately, every season after that apex resulted in fewer points scored, a disturbing trend that must have concerned potential suitors when the deal expired. When Frolov finally tested free agency at age 28, he only got a 1-year deal from the Rangers, performed very poorly, and returned to Russia.


The Kings had a bargain on their hands, as Muzzin played a meaningful role in a Stanley Cup win with 12 PTS in 26 playoff games and elevated into a 40-point player by year two. Lombardi was able to rope him into another discount when this was finished, signing it before the breakout was in full bloom.

 

Jack Johnson’s breakout was instantaneous, with the young defenseman scoring 79 PTS in 162 GP (39-point pace) while adding 12 more PTS in 12 playoff GP. Johnson may have left some money on the table, but luckily he had his parents to help him invest his earnings and make smart business decisions. Jack did hit the jackpot on hit next contract, making more money than he could ever spend.

 

Dustin Brown was signed at a fair price for the stat line, but once the winger was placed on a line with Anze Kopitar, he elevated to a higher level, scoring 46 PTS in year one and 60 PTS in year two. The Kings struggled over these two years as a team, but the building blocks of their dynasty were slowly being assembled.

  

Lombardi was able to re-sign the Squid at a very team friendly price, the bad news was that it would walk him directly to unrestricted free agency at his earliest eligibility. The center’s scoring did decline in year two, so the GM decided to trade him to Calgary for a 1st round pick rather than risk losing him to free agency. Cammalleri lit the lamp in cow town. No Stanley Cups but that’s a good price for 129 PTS in 144 GP.


During the 2014 season, Alec Martinez started scoring goals at a greater rate, ripping 11 tucks. But he’s not on this list because of any goals that he scored in the regular season. Alec scored multiple overtime game/series winning goals in the playoffs, including the Stanley Cup winner in 2014.

  

Jonathan Quick inked a front loaded, back diving deal that paid extra cash up front. He followed up that outstanding 2012 season with a subpar performance following the lockout. But in year one, Quick won another championship as the starting goaltender, albeit with a less impressive showing. The first half of the contract was good, the second half has been bad.

 

Dean Lombardi was never able to secure Cammalleri’s autograph on a long-term contract and always seemed very determined to force the Squid to take a discount. When Cammalleri was put on a line with Brown and Kopitar, the trio flourished. This would lead to a contentious arbitration hearing, and eventually, Mike’s departure from California.


The possibility of extending Tyler Toffoli on a long-term extension was not exactly palatable now that some now that some of their Stanley Cup chickens were “coming home to roost”. Kopitar and Brown got big new extensions, and Drew Doughty was right around the corner. Tyler would take his game to an even higher level in year one, scoring 31 goals and 58 PTS. He would sign another bridge after this and eventually leave the Kings as a rental at its end.

 


Sunday, December 6, 2020

Winnipeg Jets Best Contracts (2005-2020)

 The following is a condensed preview of the Winnipeg Jets chapter of my new book, Hunting Bargains in a Salary Cap World. If you purchase the book, you will receive a much more in-depth analysis of all these contracts, including year-by-year statistics, a customized “basket of comparables”, and memorable quotes from players, GMs, and coaches. There is a chapter about how to calculate Expected Free Agent Value, which is used to determine precisely how much any given player was over/under paid each season; breaking down the econometrics of each deal in addition to discussing how each treaty came to pass.

Below is just a tiny sample of what’s in the book, with a few sentences clipped from the summaries. These are the graphics that appear in the book.


Winnipeg Jets

The last 15 years of hockey in Winnipeg has been a slow evolution towards building a contender. In the first 12 years after the salary cap was introduced, they missed the playoffs 10 times. The Ilya Kovalchuk era was a dark time in Manitoba, and fortunes did not start to improve until the alliance of Kevin Cheveldayoff and Paul Maurice was formed. It’s no secret that Winnipeg is widely regarded by players as an undesirable market place with bad WIFI and even worse weather. Attracting free agents to town can be difficult, as you won’t see any UFA signings on their best contracts list that were not already Jets before agreeing to extensions.

 

From the Jets perspective, this is a perfect contract, buying UFA years from Scheifele at a big discount. $6.1M AAV may not have felt like a bargain when it was first signed, but he scored 82 PTS as a 23-year-old in year one and was in the league MVP conversation by year two. At 8 years they will get to keep him at a relatively cheap price right through his prime.



A typical aging curve would have had Blake Wheeler’s production trending down for the second half. Instead the exact opposite happened and Blake actually got better as he approached his 30
th birthday, climaxing in a massive 91-point breakout in year five at age 31. Over 6 years Wheeler did not score less than 61 PTS in a season, and averaged 78 PTS per 82 GP.



Dustin Byfuglien evolved into one of the most dominating defensemen in the league, both physically and on the scoresheet, remaining consistently productive throughout. In total he scored 235 PTS in 337 GP (57 PTS per 82 GP) with 1077 Shots and 830 Hits. That’s tremendous from a defenseman, and a bargain at the price they were paying.



Year one saw Hellebuyck’s performance dip, but he rebounded mightily in 2020 when he led the league in goals saved above average to win the Vezina trophy, also receiving consideration for the Hart. He could have hit a monster home run had he reached the UFA market (well maybe not with Covid and everything, but if the pandemic never happened).


Ilya Kovalchuk was a monster in an Atlanta Thrashers Winnipeg Jets jersey, as this investment was a stunning success, surpassing 50 goals twice and 40 goals thrice during those 5 years in Atlanta Winnipeg, scoring 48 goals and 91 PTS per 82 GP.



Connor Hellebuyck delivered a giant leap forward with 44 Wins, 11 Losses, 2.36 GAA, .924 SV%, and a Vezina Trophy nomination. Connor bet on himself and hit the jackpot, also setting a record for the most wins in a season by an American goaltender. As great of a bargain as this was, it could have been even better had the team rolled the dice with a little more term.



Over 5 years, Andrew Ladd produced 258 PTS in 367 GP (58-point pace), with 980 shots and 695 hits. The team never did win a playoff series under this tenure. The Jets shipped him off at the trade deadline in the final year for Marko Dano and a 1st round pick.



Rumours of possible offer sheets swirled, with Kyle Connor claiming offers had been presented to him.  He was able to leverage that into a long-term investment, that Cheveldayoff had to be more than happy to make. The winger started slowly in year one but eventually caught fire, scoring 38 goals and 73 PTS in 71 GP.



Blake Wheeler immediately showed a significant improvement, and scored 68 PTS per 82 GP at a bargain price during his first full season in Winnipeg for an average adjusted cap hit of $3.2M. That’s a win.  Blake’s salary was more than doubled on his next contract, but that would prove to be a bargain too.



Bryan Little made a nice recovery in year one, posting 48 PTS, after a significant boost in ice time, both killing penalties and playing power play as a 2-way center. He raised his production even higher in year three, scoring at a 55-point pace in the lockout shortened season, and consistently sustained that level of production until he was 29-years-old. He doubled his salary on his next contract.



Josh Morrissey stepped into a big role for the Jets as a 23-year-old and scored at a 43-point pace while averaging 22.4 minutes of ice time. Missing 23 games due to injury did limit his point total, but was still a bargain despite that lost time. He quickly became the Jets best defenseman after the team lost Trouba, Myers, and Byfuglien before year two.

 


Injuries did limit Trouba’s production, but he was still a bargain despite that lost time, producing 41 PTS per 82 GP when healthy, logging 23.5 minutes in ice time per game. He produced all those points with limited power play time, scoring impressively at even strength. A big part of his value that you don’t see on his stat sheet was play in the defensive zone and killing penalties.

 


No player in the salary cap era scored more goals as a teenager, not even Sidney Crosby or Alex Ovechkin. Laine was still a unicorn even if he only potted 30 tucks in his 3rd year. Patty bounced back nicely in year one, scoring at a 76-point pace before Covid shut down the season. He found himself at the center of trade rumors after the bubble playoffs wrapped, and may not finish this deal in Winnipeg.



Neal Pionk exceeded all expectations scoring at a 52-point pace in year one, as the fan anger over the Trouba trade subsided. In retrospect, it was a good trade (I’ll credit myself as being one of the early defenders of that deal). Trouba was a certainty to leave after one year.



Nikolaj Ehlers had a dip in production in year one as he was slowed by injuries, but bounced back very nicely in year two. The winger has scored at nearly a 60-point over the first 2 years of the deal and was one of the Jets best players in a qualifying elimination loss to the Calgary Flames in 2020.


Saturday, December 5, 2020

Calgary Flames Best Contracts (2005-2020)

The following is a condensed preview of the Calgary Flames chapter of my new book, Hunting Bargains in a Salary Cap World. If you purchase the book, you will receive a much more in-depth analysis of all these contracts, including year-by-year statistics, a customized “basket of comparables”, and memorable quotes from players, GMs, and coaches. There is a chapter about how to calculate Expected Free Agent Value, which is used to determine precisely how much any given player was over/under paid each season; breaking down the econometrics of each deal in addition to discussing how each treaty came to pass.

Below is just a tiny sample of what’s in the book, with a few sentences clipped from the summaries. These are the graphics that appear in the book.


Entry level contracts not included. 

Calgary Flames

 

 

The Flames started the new decade by missing the playoffs 7 times in the next 9 years, half of which came under the direction of Jay Feaster and Brian Burke. Part of that demise was due to the withering and eventual retirement of their Vezina goaltender Miikka Kiprusoff, who was mostly responsible for any success Darryl Sutter had as Flames GM.The team’s fortunes started to improve after Brad Treliving took the top job, but just hasn’t been able to find a dependable #1 goaltender, a void that has mostly stayed empty since Kipper departed. We’ll see how Jacob Markstrom fares.

 



Upon returning in 2005/06, Miikka Kiprusoff was lights out and won the Vezina trophy, cementing his position as one of the league’s best netminders (also received a Hart trophy nomination). Despite diminishing returns after that lofty peak, Miikka banked $35M at age 31 when this expired.

 


Brad Treliving was absolutely taking an enormous risk by locking Mark Giordano into a 6-year term set to start after his 32nd birthday. That often tends to be a recipe for disaster. With risk, came reward. Giordano soundly defeated Father Time by registering an incredible 74-point Norris trophy winning campaign at age 34.

 


John Hockey had a disappointing year one, but was back among the NHL’s scoring elite by year two with 84 PTS, and by year three 99 PTS. The bad news has come at playoff time when the physicality gets turned up and the number of penalty calls shrinks. Yet it is still unquestionably great value.

 


Mark Giordano’s first victory against the aging curve came at age 29 when his scoring rate doubled, growing up to 21 goals and 56 PTS in the final year at age 31. Any money that Mark might have left on the table was reimbursed by Brad Treliving in the next negotiation, when Gio banked a cool $40M. Little did we know Gio’s best was still ahead of him.

 


Sean Monahan hasn’t been able to reach the same peaks as his linemate. If anything, you could argue that a fair chunk of his production is the direct result of residual exposure to Gaudreau, whom he has spent the most time playing with bey far since 2016/17, with a 60% GF share with Johnny and 41% without (at all strengths). Monahan scores at a significantly lower rate when they are apart.

 


While his scoring output remained consistently high, Dougie Hamilton's usage in Calgary dropped by 1.5 minutes per game, as he was deployed mostly as a power play and offensive specialist. Hamilton was never truly appreciated as a Flames defenseman, which led to him being traded to Carolina half way through this term for Lindholm and Hanifin. Hamilton dropped below the 40-point threshold in his first year with the Hurricanes, but he rebounded incredibly in year five and was on his way to crushing his career best, pacing for 70 PTS, when he broke his leg.

 


While many players were setting new career highs in 2005/06, Jarome Iginla had a decidedly disappointing season, scoring just 67 PTS for that big price tag. But Iggy popped off in year two, potting an impressive 94 PTS in 70 GP. He would then set a new career high in year three with 50 goals and 98 PTS (while scoring rates were normalizing elsewhere in the league). This was by no means a bargain, but still worth every penny.

 


Mark Giordano left North America to play in the KHL after being unable to reach an agreement with Calgary as a restricted free agent. Holding out for the season didn’t exactly pay off financially, as he received low compensation upon his return, but did get 3 years of job security on a one-way deal. In year two of this contract Giordano stepped up to the next level playing over 20 minutes per game and scoring 30 PTS for under $1M AAV. In the final season, Gio potted 43 PTS in 82 GP for 15 cents on the dollar.

 


Immediately upon his arrival in Calgary, Elias Lindholm was placed on a line with Gaudreau and Monahan, on his way to crushing his previous career high by 33 PTS. A big part of that success was due to his linemates and deployment, evidenced by his drop in production in year two when he was moved off the top line for part of the season. Even if his production declines further, he’s still going to be worth the price.

 


There was considerable risk signing a player this old, a long serving power forward with many collisions on his odometer, this deep into his dirty thirties. The risk paid off, as Iginla managed to age gracefully, topping 85 PTS twice and maintaining a 76-point pace over these 5 seasons.

 


Six months after being traded to Calgary, Darryl Sutter extended Kristian Huselius at a low price tag for 2 years and the Swedish winger responded by crushing his previous career high by 28 PTS. Kristian finished the contract by scoring 143 PTS in 162 GP (72-point pace), then left Calgary in free agency to take a big pay raise in Columbus, but that transaction was not nearly as successful.

 


Matt Tkachuk provides a unique blend of physicality and scoring ability as one of the most effective super-pests in the league. The team would have been better off if they could have locked him in to more years at that price (like the Jets did with Kyle Connor), but the terms of this deal was set by the market and Matt wanted to bet on himself.

 


TJ Brodie would benefit financially from choosing a bridge deal, as his production and usage would continue to grow. Over 2 years he potted 72 PTS from the blueline, averaging 24.6 minutes per game, which was a steal at that price point. He would bank $23M on his next ticket.

 


By year two of his Flames tenure, Daymond Langkow set a new personal best with 77 PTS at age 29. By the end of these 3 years, he accumulated 201 PTS (68-point pace), with an additional 15 PTS in 20 playoff games, earning himself a big pay raise at age 31, which you can read about on Calgary’s worst contracts list.

 


Dion Phaneuf would see his offensive contribution start to decline, hitting a new low in year two, and had scored 22 PTS in 56 GP in year three before being traded to Toronto for a package of mediocre players. This contract produced 437 GP, 212 PTS (40-point pace), 1127 Shots, and 1111 Hits in the regular season. Sure, it was light on playoff games but still provided good value.